The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs expired with the 102nd Congress on January 2, 1993. Its investigation into this tragic and troubling issue was the most exhaustive of any congressional effort so far, but The American Legion's review of its final report and assessment of its work over that past year discloses that much work remains to be done and many questions remain unanswered. The members of the senate committee agree on this point.

In this report, The American Legion analyzes the Senate Select Committee's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Areas of conflict and agreement with Legion resolutions are identified.

Also presented is an overall assessment of the accomplishments and shortcomings of the Select Committee, and a discussion of what remains to be done.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

• Objectives
• Organization of this Report
• Background
• Discussion
• The Future
• Findings and Conclusions
• Recommendations

SECTION I: EXTRACT OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

• Part One: Summary of the Findings and Conclusions
  • The War in Indochina. Concerning the Missing; What Happened to Them?
  • The War in Indochina. Concerning Executive Branch Policy and Performance
  • The War in Indochina. Live-Sighting Reports
  • The War in Indochina. The Committee Review of Private POW/MIA Efforts
  • World War II
  • The Cold War
  • The Korean War
  • U.S.-Russian Cooperation on POW/MIA Matters

• Part Two: Summary of the Recommendations of the Senate Select Committee
  • The War in Indochina. Accounting for the Missing
  • The War in Indochina. Concerning Executive Branch Policy and Performance
  • Executive Branch Relations with Families
  • Future Conflicts
  • U.S.-Russian Cooperation on POW/MIA Matters
  • Accounting for the Missing from the Korean War

• Part Three: Findings and Conclusions, with Quotations from the Report
  • The War in Indochina. Concerning the Missing; What Happened to Them?
  • The War in Indochina. Concerning Executive Branch Policy and Performance
  • The War in Indochina. Live-Sighting Reports
  • The War in Indochina. The Committee Review of Private POW/MIA Activities
  • World War II
  • The Cold War
  • The Korean War
  • U.S.-Russian Cooperation on POW/MIA Matters

• Part Four: Recommendations of the Senate Committee
  • The War in Indochina. Accounting for the Missing
  • The War in Indochina. Concerning Executive Branch Policy and Performance
  • Executive Branch Relations with Families
  • Future Conflicts
  • U.S.-Russian Cooperation on POW/MIA Matters
  • Accounting for the Missing from the Korean War

SECTION II: ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

• Introduction

• Part One: The findings and Conclusions
  • Finding Number One (POWs in Indochina)
  • Finding Number Two (Conspiracy to Cover-up)
  • Finding Number Three (World War II)
  • Finding Number Four (The Cold War)
  • Finding Number Five (The Korean War)

• Part Two: The Recommendations
  • Recommendation Number One (Highest Priority)
  • Recommendation Number Two (Reviews of Performance)
  • Recommendation Number Three (Expansion of Investigatory Effort in Indochina
  • Recommendation Number Four (Reorganization)
  • Recommendation Number Five (Joint Commission)
  • Recommendation Number Six (China and North Korea)
  • Other Recommendations Addressed to DoD

SECTION III: ASSESSMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

• Introduction

• Goals
  • To Determine the Existence of Evidence of Surviving POWs
  • To Ensure the Adequacy of Government Procedures
  • To De-mystify the POW/MIA Accounting Process
  • To Provide an Open Record and Broad Declassification of POW/MIA Materials
  • To Reinforce Executive Branch Efforts to Obtain Cooperation from Foreign Governments
  • To Review the Activities of Private Organizations
  • To Examine the Issues of Missing Americans from World War II, Korea, and the Cold War

SECTION IV: WHAT MUST BE DONE

INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVES

1. To analyze the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, with particular concentration on its findings, conclusions and recommendations, and to correlate these with The Legion's resolutions on the subject of POW/MIAs. To recommend actions to achieve real progress on the POW/MIA issue in accordance with current Legion POW/MIA resolutions.

2. To review and assess the accomplishments and shortcomings of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, to identify those matters and issues that require further investigation and action.

ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

This report is organized into four sections: Section I is an extract of the Report of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. It extracts from the Report all the important findings, conclusions and recommendations, arranges them in accordance with the subject with which they deal, and then supports each with direct quotations from the Report. In order to facilitate a coherent analysis, these 61 findings, conclusions and recommendations are combined, condensed and synthesized into 11: five conclusions and six recommendations.

Section II is an analysis of the major findings, conclusions and recommendations. It examines each in terms of the evidence. It asks, could the evidence have supported different conclusions? What other, or alternative recommendations would be appropriate?

Section III is an overall assessment of the Committee's work. How well did it accomplish the objectives it set out for itself? What is left to be done?

Section IV is an analysis of the incompleteness of the Committee's report and what must be done to resolve the issue.

BACKGROUND

The Select Committee was authorized by the Senate in July 1991 but was not staffed to begin its investigation until November, when it held its first hearings. Not until late January, 1992, when more staff was added, was it able to begin its investigation into live-sightings and other important intelligence aspects. The effort remained concentrated on the war in Indochina throughout 1992 and only one investigator was detailed, in July, to work part time on the question of the missing from World War II, Korea, and the Cold War. This despite the fact that the charter of the committee clearly embraced all wars.

The Rules Committee hearings that resulted in the establishment of the Select Committee also show that the sponsors of the legislation, as well as the witnesses and several members of the Rules Committee, all expected that the investigation of the POW/MIA matter would require two years to complete. Furthermore, it was clear in the testimony that the "sunset clause" that terminated the Select Committee with the 102nd Congress, inserted into the resolution by the Senate leadership, was agreed to with the understanding that an extension in the life of the committee would be possible if necessary. No such extension was requested and the Select Committee expired with its task unfinished.

The Committee issued its Report on January 13, 1993, but had to withdraw it immediately because an important section had been inadvertently omitted and a number of other errors were detected. A corrected version was issued on January 25, but the green-bound GPO volume bears the date "January 13." The Report runs 500 pages, followed by an appendix of more that 700 pages. Plans to issue a second volume that would contain the references footnoted in the Report were abandoned because the number of documents was far too great to be reproduced and published. Instead, these documents will be transferred to the National Archives.

The Report is not organized for ease of analysis. Findings, conclusions, and recommendations are not systematically or comprehensively stated anywhere in the Report, but appear partially in the "Executive Summary", within and at the end of some chapters, and in a concluding chapter titled, "Retrospective." Some relate to what the Select Committee found or concluded with regard to the status of the missing, and other conclusions relate to its views on how the issue was handled by the Executive Branch, how families fared with DIA and the Services, and a number of other subjects.

DISCUSSION

Despite its organizational difficulties, the Committee Report is likely to stand as a detailed exposition of the POW/MIA issue. It is, overall, a report of what the Committee accomplished and how it went about its business. Its findings and conclusions contain no startling revelations and it recommends no radical remedies. The effort to produce a document to reflect a consensus has resulted in a bland, inconclusive report that will satisfy few citizens, families or activists.

A review of previous legislative branch inquiries and investigations into this issue firmly supports the Select Committee's assertion that its investigation was by any measure the most complete and exhaustive of any undertaken so far. It acknowledged in its Report and in its press conference of January 13 that it had "opened the door" to resolution of the POW/MIA problem, but had not had time to follow all the leads it uncovered. Many live-sighting reports remain under active investigation in Vietnam, although the value of these investigations is questionable, given the facts that no-notice investigations are impossible and private, secure access by American investigators to Vietnamese witnesses is not permitted by the authorities. Many Vietnamese documents remain to be analyzed and witnesses remain to be interviewed. Access to Laos is still restricted, the matter of POWs transferred to the Soviet Union requires much more study and investigation, and the questions about hundreds of POWs taken by North Korea and China remain unanswered.

THE FUTURE

In the concluding pages of the Report, under the heading, "Retrospective", the Committee looks to the future and sets down several principal areas of inquiry and interest that must be completed. (pp. 447-449)

* At the top of the list is the recommendation "that the U.S./Russia Commission continue to pursue those leads which involve the countries of the former Soviet Union, . . ."

* It urges the Executive Branch to "continue to work with the governments . . ." of Indochina to find answers to the many unanswered questions. It identifies a few of these questions, but the list is by no means complete.

* It reiterates its strong recommendation that commissions similar to the U.S./Russia Commission be established with Korea and China.

* The Committee recommends that the Department of Defense--

Continue the JTF-FA approach to information gathering in Southeast Asia;

Declassify and release to the public all records relating to PFC Robert Garwood;

Reexamine the Homecoming debriefs;

Interview former President Thieu for information his intelligence organizations may have had on American POWs;

Continue the analysis of the over 4,500 photos received from the Government of Vietnam;

Continue the analysis and evaluation of Vietnamese archival materials; and

Continue support of the Vessey initiatives.

* The IAG should be continued, but it should keep formal records and the participation of the League of Families should be reexamined.

* The Department of Justice should proceed with possible fraud prosecutions in regard to the referrals the Committee gave it and evaluate any new referrals the Committee may forward.

* The Congress should seek the information in the Watergate tapes that was denied the Committee.

The twelve members of the Select Committee assure us, in their "Executive Summary" to the Report, that the outstanding questions--to the extent they are not dealt with adequately by the Executive branch--will be "pursued through the normal Committee structure of the Congress." They will also work with the Clinton Administration "to see that the major recommendations of the Select Committee are implemented. . . ." If history and experience are reliable guides, the American people can take little comfort in these assurances. The "normal Committee structure of the Congress" failed for two decades in its oversight of this issue, and the Executive branch, in successive administrations (at least prior to the current one) has moved aggressively only when prodded by the Congress, The Legion, and other organizations and activists.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Our analysis extracted 31 important findings and conclusions from the Report but five are more important than others and go to the heart of this long-lived controversy:

1. A small number of Americans may have been detained by the Communists after Homecoming, but there is no compelling evidence that any are in captivity in Indochina today.

2. There was no conspiracy to cover-up POW/MIA information from families or the public.

3. Some American POWs were held by the Soviet Union after World War II, but there is no proof that any are still captive.

4. Some Americans captured by the Soviets during the Cold War may still be held on the territory of the former U.S.S.R.

5. Some American POWs were taken to the U.S.S.R during the Korean War and could still be alive there.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Likewise, some of the Committee's recommendations are more significant than others. We extracted 30 recommendations from the Report and condensed and combined them into six that include all of the issues the Committee believed important enough to mention, with the possible exception of its charge to the Department of Justice regarding fraud prosecution (p. 449). The six are as follows:

1. Accounting for the missing from the Indochina War should have the highest national priority.

2. There should be regular, independent reviews of DoD's performance in POW/MIA matters, to include DIA's conduct of its relations with the families.

3. The DoD investigatory effort in Indochina should be expanded.

4. A comprehensive reorganization of the mechanisms for handling POW/MIA matters in future conflicts is required.

5. A high priority should be placed on U.S-Russian cooperation and the continuation of the Joint Commission and Task Force Russia.

6. Joint commissions and/or task forces to investigate POW/MIA matters in North Korea and China should be established.

SECTION I: EXTRACT OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

PART ONE: SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The findings and conclusions as stated below are not direct quotes from the Select Committee Report. Rather, they are the sense of the Select Committee findings and conclusions, derived from the pertinent quotations that appear in Part Three of this Section of this extract.

The War in Indochina. Concerning the Missing; What Happened to Them?

1. A small number of Americans who survived capture may have been detained by the North Vietnamese, the Pathet Lao, or the Chinese after Homecoming.

2. The question of whether any POWs were held back because of their technical or military specialties has not been answered.

3. There is no definite proof that any authentic distress signals were constructed by downed air-crewmen after 1973 in Indochina.

4. There is no compelling evidence that American POWs remain in captivity in Indochina.

5. There is no motive for the Communists to keep American POWs for this long, and while there is no credible evidence that they offered POWs for money, two incidents which suggest they did require further explanation.

6. There is no evidence to prove that American POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union from Indochina.

The War in Indochina. Concerning Executive Branch Policy and Performance

1. The Nixon Administration expected more POWs to be returned than the North Vietnamese released at Homecoming, it pressed the DRV for a full accounting, but it publicly asserted that none remained alive in captivity.

2. It cannot be charged that Administration officials abandoned POWs in Indochina because they had no certain knowledge about any particular living POW still in captivity.

3. There is no evidence of a conspiracy to hide information about the POW/MIA issue, but successive administrations were less than candid and open with the public and families.

4. Fewer resources and a lower priority were assigned to the POW/MIA issue than it deserved until the Reagan Administration.

5. Overall, accounting for POW/MIAs was unprofessional for years and although the current, official list of the unaccounted for is probably accurate, significant casualty and intelligence files pertaining to POWs and MIAs are missing, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable.

6. Policy did not assign a high priority to POW/MIA intelligence collection, appropriate intelligence assets were not committed, coordination among intelligence agencies was poor, analysis was poor and biased, and available data was not exploited.

7. Intelligence support for the POW/MIA recovery effort in Laos during the war was handicapped by Administration policy which, at State Department insistence, limited the employment of significant intelligence assets in Laos.

8. The analysis of possible pilot distress signals was unprofessional, contradictory, and excessively delayed.

9. Much of the controversy surrounding the handling of the POW/MIA matter derived from excessive, prolonged, classification of relevant documents and although recent Administration cooperation in declassification has been commendable, it is incomplete and the CIA still denies access to pertinent POW files.

10. In dealing with their government, families of the missing faced an array of problems that could have, and should have been avoided.

The War in Indochina. Live-Sighting Reports

1. Every live-sighting report is important, but DIA did not treat them as important elements of information.

2. Committee investigators posted 928 live-sighting reports on a map of Indochina and noted that many of the reports tended to cluster at certain localities. This was termed a "Cluster Analysis" and what it indicated was a matter of dispute within the Committee and with DIA. The opposing views were:

a. This application of "Cluster Analysis" raises questions but contributes nothing toward a judgment about surviving POWs. (The opinion of ten Senators.)

b. The clusters show that American POWs remained alive in captivity until 1989. (The opinion of two Senators.)

The War in Indochina. The Committee Review of Private POW/MIA Efforts

1. Most are honest, dedicated, organizations providing valuable service.

2. Organizations engaged in POW recovery operations have uniformly failed in their efforts, have been based on poor or fraudulent intelligence, can interfere with official activities, and sometimes violate laws.

3. Private organizations that have offered rewards for POW/MIA information have encouraged a "cottage industry" in Indochina that is engaged in the manufacture and reporting of false documentation, photographs and accounts.

4. A few private POW/MIA organizations have used false or misleading information in fund solicitations and diverted funds to purposes other than those advertised.

World War II

Some American POWs were held by the former Soviet Union after World War II but there is no proof that any are now being held against their will.

The Cold War

Some American military personnel were captured in Cold War incidents and imprisoned by the former Soviet Union and the possibility that one or more may still be held within those former borders cannot be ruled out.

The Korean War

1. Soviet officials were involved in the interrogation of American POWs.

2. Many American POWs were held in China during the war and POW camps in Korea were run by the Chinese.

3. A breakthrough in terms of gaining access to new information about POW/MIAs from the North Koreans has been reached.

4. Some American POWs were taken to the Soviet Union.

5. One or more POWs from the Korean Conflict could still be alive on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

6. It is likely that many remains of MIA's and some documents relating to POW/MIAs can be obtained from North Korea if a joint commission can be established there.

U.S.-Russian Cooperation on POW/MIA Matters

The POW/MIA research and investigative effort in Russia is being actively conducted by Task Force Russia but much remains to be done.

PART TWO: SUMMARY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations as stated below are not direct quotes from the Select Committee Report. Rather, they are the sense of the Select Committee's recommendations, derived from the pertinent quotations that appear in Part Four of this section of this analysis.

The War in Indochina. Accounting for the Missing

1. Accounting for MIAs should continue to be a matter of highest national priority.

2. The remaining unresolved discrepancy cases should be investigated in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

3. The U.S. should make a continuing effort to secure an accounting of the MIAs in Laos through regular, tri-partite, U.S.-Lao-Vietnamese meetings at high levels.

The War in Indochina. Concerning Executive Branch Policy and Performance

1. There should be regular, independent reviews of DoD's performance in accounting for the MIAs.

2. There should be regular evaluations of DIA's POW/MIA office to ensure that intelligence information is exploited quickly and promptly shared with the families.

3. The role and composition of the IAG should be re-evaluated with a bias toward eliminating participation by the League of Families.

4. There should be a rapid and thorough follow-up and evaluation of current unresolved and future live-sighting reports.

5. Major reforms are required in the handling of apparent signals possibly constructed by POWs in Indochina.

6. DIA analysts should maintain a positive attitude on the question of surviving POWs.

7. The ability of the U.S. to conduct POW/MIA investigations and inspections should be expanded in Indochina.

8. The DIA POW/MIA office should be moved to Hawaii and its public and family relations functions should be assumed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs.

Executive Branch Relations with Families

1. U.S. officials working on POW/MIA matters in the field in Indochina should meet, when possible, with families in the United States.

2. The DoD must assign properly trained personnel, sensitive to the concerns and feelings of the families, to positions that interact with the next-of-kin of the missing.

3. The Executive Branch should assist Vietnam era POW/MIA family members who wish to visit Indochina for discussions with U.S. and foreign officials.

4. A regular POW/MIA newsletter should be published for families.

5. The Executive Branch should establish a comprehensive data base, on a system readily available to families, with information on all POW/MIAs from all past conflicts.

Future Conflicts

1. The responsibility for POW/MIA issues in future conflicts should be assigned to one individual, with a clearly defined hierarchy, capable of commanding full and rapid coordination and cooperation among all involved agencies.

2. An Inter-agency Coordination Center should be created for POW/MIA intelligence under the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. Missing civilians and deserters should be integrated into the POW/MIA accounting process.

4. Liaison must be established between our peace negotiators and those responsible for POW/MIA accounting and the related intelligence.

5. There must be procedures for prompt and full disclosure of information to next of kin.

6. Military service casualty officers should be knowledgeable, experienced civilians, not subject to frequent transfer in order effectively to deal with families.

7. Clear and consistently applied POW/MIA categories must be established.

8. The applicable law should be reviewed to minimize the influence financial considerations may have on the determination of status.

U.S.-Russian Cooperation on POW/MIA Matters

1. The U.S. Government should demonstrate to the Russian leadership that the U.S continues to place a high priority on Russian cooperation on this issue.

2. The U.S.-Russia Joint Commission should be continued and the full cooperation of the other Republics of the former Soviet Union should be secured.

3. The Joint Commission should place special attention on gaining information about Cold War losses.

4. More investigation is required relative to the possible transfer of U.S. POWs from Vietnam to the U.S.S.R.

Accounting for the Missing from the Korean War

1. A joint, working level, POW/MIA commission should be established with the North Koreans.

2. Defense and State should form a task force on China similar to Task Force Russia.

PART THREE: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The sentences and paragraphs appearing in bold type are direct quotes from the cited pages of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Report of 13 January 1993.

The War in Indochina. Concerning the Missing; What Happened to Them?

1. Were POWs were kept by North Vietnam after Homecoming and if so, how many? A small number of Americans who survived capture may have been detained by the North Vietnamese, the Pathet Lao, or the Chinese after Homecoming.

. . . approximately 100 American civilians and servicemen expected to return at Operation Homecoming did not. Some . . . were known to have been taken captive; some were known only to have survived their incidents; others were thought likely to have survived. (p.6) (Also see p.258)

. . . there is no proof that U.S. POWs survived, but neither is there proof that all of those who did not return had died. There is evidence, moreover , that indicates the possibility of survival, at least for a small number, after Operation Homecoming. (p.7)

. . . the United States had hard evidence that some Americans who were held captive by the North Vietnamese or the Pathet Lao did not appear on the DRV's December, 1970 list of prisoners. (p.122)(For a discussion of this and other lists, see the Report, p.140, et. seq.)

. . . rumors about hundreds or thousands of Americans languishing in camps or bamboo cages. . . {are} arithmetically impossible. . . . there remain only a few cases where we know an unreturned POW was alive in captivity and we do not have evidence that the individual also died while in captivity. (p.10)

Of the 2,264 Americans now listed as unaccounted for, 1,095 {are} . . . killed in action/body not recovered. . . . Approximately 1,172 . . . were lost in circumstances under which survival was deemed likely or at least reasonably possible. These cases . . . are currently referred to as "discrepancy cases." Of these, {798 were lost in North and South Vietnam and all but 135 of these cases have been resolved.} (p.15)

No Americans held captive in Laos for a significant period of time have ever been returned. . . . Top military and intelligence officials expressed the hope . . . that as many as 41 servicemen lost in Laos would be returned. However only ten . . . were on the list of prisoners captured in Laos that was turned over by the DRV. (pp.12-13)

More than 500 Americans are still listed as unaccounted for in Laos, including 335 who were originally considered either POW or MIA. (p.29)

... in December 1979, a third-party intercept was received indicating three U.S. prisoners being moved from Muoung Vieng Sai to Muong Attopeu to work in the mines. In December 1980, a third-party intercept indicated 20 American POWs were about to be moved from Oudom Sai province to Vientiane. In 1984, an intercept referred to the movement of 23 unidentified prisoners . . . in Laos. . . . NSA noted that this number corresponded with collateral information concerning the presence of 23 American POWs at a camp in Southern Laos. (pp.224-225)

. . . in 1986, an intercept referring to the movement of unidentified "prisoners of war" to Nong Tha, Laos raised questions at NSA, because "the Lao do not normally refer to captured Thai soldiers or Lao expatriates as 'prisoners of war'." . . . none of the reports have been judged to be accurate by either the National Security Agency or the Defense Intelligence Agency. (p.225)

The possibility of live U.S. prisoners being held back, especially in Laos, was taken seriously enough by high-level Administration officials to justify a short-lived decision to halt troop withdrawals . . . and led to recommendations . . . for military action. (p.122)

{A covert} operation was prompted by a combination of human, photographic and signals intelligence concerning the possible presence of as many as 30 American POWs at a detention camp . . . in Laos from 1979 until early 1981. (pp.26-27) (Also see pp.219-221, 276)

The actions of U.S. officials in response to this intelligence attest to the quality and quantity of that intelligence. (p.219)

At Operation Homecoming, ten Americans . . . were listed as unaccounted for over China. Of these, three had been reported alive in the Peking Municipal Prison as late as December 1971 and were released in March 1973. The others remain unaccounted-for. (p.146)

2. Did the enemy select certain specialists to retain and not to release at Homecoming? The question of whether any POWs were held back because of their technical or military specialties has not been answered.

. . . the findings did indicate that there were some military background and mission characteristics frequently associated with non-returning POWs/MIAs, but the question of whether any POWs/MIAs were held back because of these or other characteristics remains an open one. (p.260)

3. Were authentic distress signals constructed by American air-crewmen on the ground in Indochina after 1973? There is no definite proof that such signals were constructed.

Although the Committee cannot rule out the possibility that U.S. POWs attempted to signal their status to aerial observers, the Committee cannot conclude, based on its own investigation and the guidance of imagery experts, that this has definitely happened. (p.26) (See also para. 8, p.28, below, "On the subject of pilot distress signals", and the Report, p.216.)

4. On the question of whether any Americans are still in captivity: There is no compelling evidence that American POWs remain in captivity in Indochina.

. . . there is, at this time, no compelling evidence that proves that any American remains alive in captivity in Southeast Asia. . . . neither live-sighting reports nor other sources of intelligence have provided grounds for encouragement, . . . (Senators Smith and Grassley . . . believe that live-sighting reports and other sources of intelligence are evidence that POWs may have survived to the present.) (p.9)

It is DIA's position that live-sighting reports evaluated to date do not constitute evidence that currently unaccounted for U.S. POWs remained behind in Southeast Asia after the end of the war. . . . The Committee notes that . . . the nature of the analytic process precludes certainty that all past DIA evaluations are correct. (p.21-22)

5. On the questions of motive and charging money for the return of prisoners: There is no motive for the Communists to keep American POWs for this long, and while there is no credible evidence that they offered POWs for money, two incidents which suggest they did require further explanation.

The Committee has found no convincing evidence of any such offer being made. There were, however, two incidents which require further explanation . . . . (p.282)

. . . the majority of Committee Members believes . . . that the Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese might have seen reason to hold back American prisoners in 1973 or for a short period thereafter; it is quite another to discern a motive for holding prisoners . . . for another 19 years. . . . our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that {the Vietnamese or Lao have ever demanded money in exchange for prisoners.} (pp.9, 32)

The {Sullivan} report also noted that North Vietnam had raised the war reparations issue since 1967 and had linked it both to a cease-fire and to a prisoner exchange.. In reviewing the Sullivan report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed opposition to any payment for the return of U.S. POWs. (p.143)

6. On the question of the transfer of POWs from Indochina to the Soviet Union: There is no evidence to prove that this happened.

Information about this possibility that was provided by . . . Jerry Mooney . . . could not be substantiated. Other {such} reports . . . deserve further investigation and follow-up. (p.37) (Also see pp. 226-227)

To date, the Commission has found no documents indicating that any U.S. POWs from the Vietnam War were interned in the Soviet Union, or that any Soviet personnel participated in interrogations of U.S. POWs during the Vietnam War. p.425)

Although {the Russians} claim they did not take {part} in any interrogations in Vietnam and that no U.S. POWs were transferred from Vietnam to the Soviet Union, there is at least some circumstantial evidence that such interrogations did take place and that at least a few U.S. POWs may have been transferred from Vietnam to the Soviet Union. If so, there is a good chance that some of them could still be alive. (p.425)

The Committee found no evidence to substantiate claims that signals intelligence gathered during the war constitute evidence that U.S. POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union from Vietnam. (p.23)

. . . NSA failed to locate for investigators any wartime analyst files related specifically to tracking POWs, despite the fact that tracking POWs was a known priority at the time. This made it impossible for the Committee to confirm some information on downed pilots that was provided by NSA employee Jerry Mooney. (p.23) (Also see pp. 225-226)

The War in Indochina. Concerning Executive Branch Policy and Performance

1. On the question of whether any American POWs survived in Indochina after Homecoming: The Nixon Administration expected more POWs to be returned than the North Vietnamese released at Homecoming, it pressed the DRV for a full accounting, but it publicly asserted that none remained alive in captivity.

Nixon, Ford and Carter Administration officials all dismissed the possibility that American POWs had survived in Southeast Asia after Operation Homecoming. (p.7)

In early February {1973}, President Nixon sent a message to the DRV Prime Minister saying, . . . "U.S. records show there are 317 American military men unaccounted for in Laos and it is inconceivable that only ten of these men would be held prisoner in Laos." (p.13)

Soon thereafter, Dr. Kissinger presented DRV officials with 19 case folders of Americans who should have been accounted for, but who were not. (p.13)

The President said, and our nation wanted to believe, that all of our American POWs were on the way home. (p.8)

. . . the public record of the negotiating history . . . of the Paris Peace Accords . . . indicates that there existed a higher degree of concern within the Administration about the possibility that prisoners were being left behind in Laos than had been known previously, and that various options for responding to that concern were discussed at the highest levels of government. (p.14)

The record does indicate that efforts to gain accountability were made. . . . Defense and State Department spokesmen told Congress of their continuing dissatisfaction with the accounting process; stressed their view that the POW/MIA lists received were not complete, and referred to the cases of Americans last known alive as the most "agonizing and frustrating of all." (p.8)

2. On the question of whether Administration officials knowingly abandoned American POWs in Indochina: It cannot be charged that Administration officials abandoned POWs in Indochina because they had no certain knowledge about any particular living POW still in captivity.

The answer is clearly no. American officials did not have certain knowledge that any specific prisoner or prisoners were being left behind. (p.7)

Notwithstanding the evidence that some individuals who had certainly or probably been held captive were not being returned, the United States did not have hard, current information that particular Americans were being held in particular locations. (p.122)

3. On the question of whether the Nixon Administration, or subsequent Administrations, conspired or attempted to deceive or mislead the public about POWs possibly kept by the Communists after Homecoming: Although there is no evidence of such a conspiracy, successive administrations were less than candid and open concerning the issue.

Witness after witness was asked by our Committee if they believed in, or had evidence of, a conspiracy either to leave POWs behind or to conceal knowledge of their fates--and no evidence was produced. . . . and the vast archives of secret U.S. documents . . . have been thoroughly examined . . . only to find that the conspiracy cupboard is bare. (p.11) (Also see pp. 296-299)

There is no evidence that officials or investigators from DIA have concealed or covered up information concerning the possible presence of live Americans in Southeast Asia. (p.199)

. . . some Administration statements at the time the agreement was signed expressed greater certainty about the completeness of the POW return than they should have . . . and may have raised . . . expectations too high. . . . However, the Committee concludes that the phrasing of these statements was designed to avoid raising . . . false hopes among POW/MIA families, rather than to mislead the American people. (p.14)

. . . post-Homecoming Administration efforts to inform the American public were primarily low-level and low-key. (p.8)

Before the peace agreement was signed, those "last known alive," were referred to as "POWs;" afterwards, they were publicly, although not technically, lumped together with all of the others called "missing." (p.8)

Before the agreement, . . Administration officials berated the North Vietnamese for their failure to disclose the status of these "last known alive" cases, while citing their dramatic case histories and distributing photographs to the press. After Homecoming, Administration criticisms were less vociferous and names and case histories cited only rarely . . . . (p.8)

4. On the question of the priority and resources the Executive Branch has assigned to the POW/MIA issue: Fewer resources and a lower priority were assigned to the POW/MIA issue than it deserved until the Reagan Administration.

When the war shut down, so, too, did much of the POW/MIA related intelligence operations. Bureaucratic priorities shifted rapidly and, before long, the POW/MIA accounting operation had become more of a bureaucratic backwater than an operations center for matters of life and death. (p.8)(See also the Report, pp. 151-152)

. . . the Committee must respond to the frequently-heard criticism that our government is "not doing enough" in behalf of our missing Americans. There is no question that such criticisms have been valid at points in the past. (p.42)

Efforts to re-open dialogue on POW/MIA matters with Laos and Cambodia began following President Reagan's election in 1981. Simultaneous efforts were made to develop intelligence information on possible live American POWs. (p.155)

In 1982, President Reagan wisely raised the issue of accounting for our missing to a "matter of the highest national priority." In 1987, a Special Presidential Emissary to Vietnam was named. . . . (p.9)

The level of commitment at the highest levels of our government have never been greater, . . . (p.9)

The current DIA staff, especially those based in southeast Asia, deserve credit for an enormous and steadily increasing amount of work performed under very difficult and uncomfortable conditions. (p.199)

5. On the matter of the Executive branch performance in accounting for POW/MIAs: Overall, accounting for POW/MIAs was unprofessional for years and although the current, official list of the unaccounted for is probably accurate, significant casualty and intelligence files pertaining to POWs and MIAs are missing, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable.

The U.S. Government's process for accounting for Americans missing in Southeast Asia has been flawed by a lack of resources, organizational clarity, coordination and consistency. . . . Through the mid-1980's, accounting for our POW/MIAs was viewed officially more as a bureaucratic exercise than as a matter of "highest national priority." (pp.16, 163)

. . . the Committee uncovered numerous errors in data entry and numerous discrepancies between DIA records and those of other military offices. The errors. . . have since been corrected. . . . the Committee finds no grounds to question the accuracy of the current, official list of those unaccounted for from the war in Southeast Asia. . . . {It} found no evidence to support the existence of rumored "secret lists" of additional missing Americans. (pp.17, 164)

Today, after more than a year of diligent searching, certain key groups or documents cannot yet be located. . . . many of the individual service files have either been lost or destroyed. (p.130)

6. On the matter of national intelligence policy and performance with regard to POW/MIA information collection, analysis and production of intelligence: Policy did not assign a high priority to POW/MIA intelligence collection, appropriate intelligence assets were not committed, coordination among intelligence agencies was poor, analysis was poor and biased, and available data was not exploited.

. . . all DIA directors since the late 1970's testified that the POW effort lacked national-level Intelligence Community support in terms of establishing a high priority for collection, in funding, in allocation of personnel and in high-level attention. None of the former directors recalled attending national-level management meetings to discuss the POW/MIA issue prior to the mid-1980's, and only one national intelligence estimate was produced on this issue during the first 17 years after the end of the war. (p.19) (See also the Report, p.170, et. seq.)

Throughout the (sic) 1979, the POW/MIA issue received a low priority despite public statements of concern; in 1979, the national intelligence priority assigned the POW/MIA issue was at the lowest U.S. national priority--Priority 7. (p.276)

{The CIA had} no written collection requirement on POWs, . . . this issue was the near exclusive preserve of the {DoD} and . . . the CIA played only a supporting role. (p.19) (See also the Report, pp.169-170)

. . . signals intelligence collection efforts in Southeast Asia were dismantled after the war and was(sic) not resumed until at least 1978. (p.20) (See also p.223)

. . . the NSA and its Vietnam branch were never asked to provide an overall assessment of the status of POW/MIA personnel prior to Operation Homecoming. (p.22)

. . . neither the DIA nor any other agency within the Intelligence Community placed a formal requirement for collection with NSA concerning POW/MIA related information. . . . NSA end product reports were not used regularly to evaluate the POW/MIA situation until 1977. It was not until 1984 that the collection of information on POW/MIAs was formally established as a matter of highest priority for SIGINT. (p.22) (See also p.223)

. . . previous surveys of NSA files for POW/MIA related information had been limited to the agency's automated data base. Hundreds of thousands of hard copy documents, memoranda, raw reports, operational messages and possibly tapes from both the wartime and post-war periods remain unreviewed in various archives and storage facilities. (p.23) (See also p.223)

. . . the Reagan and Bush Administrations have raised the priority of POW/MIA intelligence collection, have increased resources and improved policy level management. (p.20)

The Committee agrees {with internal DIA reviews} that the DIA's POW/MIA Office has historically been plagued by a lack of resources; guilty of over classification (see para. 9, below); defensive toward criticism; handicapped by poor coordination with other elements of the intelligence community; frequently distracted from its basic mission by the need to respond to outside pressures and requests. (p.20)

. . . several . . . who reviewed . . . DIA during this period also faulted DIA's analytical process and referred to a "mindset to debunk" live-sighting reports. (p.20)

7. On intelligence support of the POW/MIA recovery effort in Laos during the war: This effort was handicapped by Administration policy which, at the insistence of the State Department, limited the employment of significant intelligence assets in Laos. During the Vietnam war, intelligence support for the U.S. effort in Laos was handicapped because Administration policy, at the insistence of the State Department, excluded the significant use of military intelligence assets.(p.27) (Also see pp. 229-232)

8. On the subject of pilot distress signals: The analysis of possible distress signals was unprofessional, contradictory, and excessively delayed.

. . . statements from DIA and CIA imagery analysts {revealed} that they were not very knowledgeable about the military's E&E signals or, in some cases, even aware of the program. These analysts were not even tasked to look for such information prior to April, 1992. . . . there had not been a purposeful effort to search for distress signals, or a written formal requirement for symbols, after the end of the war. (p.24) (See also p.207, et. seq.)

. . . CIA had noted the USA symbol found on imagery . . and provided it to DIA for further review. . . . It is important to note the . . . long period between the collection of the imagery and its provision to DIA: January-December 1988. (p.217)

. . . JSSA {Joint Service SERE Agency} personnel identified . . . a number of 4-digit authenticator numbers at sites of possible symbols detected by DIA. They correlated 19 of those authenticator numbers with numbers belonging to Americans still missing in Southeast Asia. (p.203)

U.S investigators did not act on one provocative symbol, even after four U.S. Senators traveled to a remote area of Laos to investigate it themselves. It was not until the Committee scheduled a public hearing on it six months later that U.S. investigators began their work. In contrast, while it took the U.S. six months to request permission to visit the site, the Government of Laos granted permission in just two days. (p.200)

. . . JSSA officials had not been consulted previously with respect to the suspected symbols, except for the 1973 "TH" photograph, which was shown to them in the mid-1980's. (p.25)

. . . DIA resolved that some of the possible symbols were the results of a combination of thickened rice paddy dike walls, shadows, burn marks in a field, tree, logs, and rice residue. . . . JSSA testified that {all such things} are consistent with SERE training.

9. On the matter of the security classifications attached to POW/MIA information from the Indochina War: Much of the controversy surrounding the handling of the POW/MIA matter derived from excessive, prolonged, classification of relevant documents and although recent Administration cooperation in declassification has been noted, it is incomplete and the CIA still denies access to pertinent POW files.

. . . much of the controversy surrounding the U.S. Government's handling of the POW/MIA issue could have been avoided if relevant documents had been declassified and made available to the public long ago. (p.30) (Also see p.233)

Although the Committee was generally very satisfied with the . . . help it received from the Executive branch, its request for the release of relevant CIA operational files has, to date, been denied. (p.31) (Also see pp.243-244)

. . . requested {IAG} documents were delivered in classified form in late November and State later notified the Committee that it would not declassify five memoranda. (p.273)

The declassification effort has opened a substantial body of evidence to public scrutiny, but declassification cannot provide all of the answers. . . . the facts contained in these documents require a judgment. The answers are not in the blacked-out portions . . .; if there are answers, they are in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. (p.244)

10. On the manner successive administrations have dealt with the families of the missing: In dealing with their government, families of the missing faced an array of problems that could have, and should have been avoided.

The Committee's review of past family experiences reflect an array of problems in dealing with our government that never should have happened and that can--with proper organization and planning--be avoided in the future. (p.41)

{The} search for the truth by the families was frustrated over the years by limited information from the governments of Southeast Asia, and by our own government's failure to provide satisfactory answers. (pp.350-351)

Intelligence analysis demands a rigorous examination of ambiguous information. Family member liaison demands a sympathetic viewpoint tempered by a sense of realism. DIA has experienced great difficulty in bringing the two perspectives together. (p.176)

The War in Indochina: Live-Sighting Reports

The Committee was unable to reach a unanimous consensus on live-sighting reports, how they should be interpreted, what they tell about Americans in captivity, and whether the DIA's POW/MIA office was professional and objective in its analysis and exploitation of these reports. In the context of POW/MIA affairs, a live-sighting report is a report, either first-hand or hearsay, that one or more Americans was seen in Indochina in circumstances that could indicate captivity. There were nearly 1,600 such reports after Homecoming. The Committee agreed on the following finding:

1. On the importance of live-sighting reports and DIA's treatment of them: Every live-sighting report is important, but DIA did not treat them as important elements of information.

. . . every live-sighting report is important because it is potential evidence that a U.S. POW may have survived; until recently, these reports were not treated as important, and accorded a high priority by DIA, however. (pp. 177-178)

As long as live-sighting reports remain under investigation, they constitute a measure of potential evidence that US POWs may have been left behind and survived in captivity, at least for a time. It is also possible that one or more of DIA's past report evaluations is incorrect. (p.198)

No Committee Member would argue that existing reports constitute hard proof that American POWs remained behind or are still being held captive in Southeast Asia. (p.199)

2. Committee investigators posted 928 live-sighting reports on a map of Indochina and noted that many of the reports tended to cluster at certain localities. This was termed a "Cluster Analysis" and what it indicated was a matter of dispute within the Committee and with DIA. The opposing views were:

a. This application of "Cluster Analysis" raises questions but contributes nothing toward a judgment about surviving POWs. (The opinion of ten Senators.)

The Committee divided , . . ten senators finding the . . . approach sufficient only to raise additional questions but meaningless in its capacity to make a judgment that a POW remained alive. (p.181)

. . . while cluster analysis can possibly assist in raising legitimate questions, without adequate sources and fundamental report verification, the analysis is meaningless. (p.186)

b. The clusters show that American POWs remained alive in captivity until 1989. (The opinion of two Senators.)

Two Senators believe the cluster analysis provides evidence Americans remained alive until 1989. (p.181)

. . . the minority believes that . . . the intelligence indicates a strong possibility that Americans remained alive until 1989; however, we cannot prove it. (p.186)

The War in Indochina. The Committee Review of Private POW/MIA Activities

With regard to the activities of non-profit organizations involved in the POW/MIA issue, the Select Committee concluded the following:

1. Most are honest, dedicated, organizations providing valuable service.

. . . the vast majority of POW/MIA related organizations are modest, local groups of volunteers operating on small budgets and dedicated to public education, grassroots lobbying, mutual assistance and remembrance activities. ... {They} have performed an important service . . . in maintaining a strong national spotlight on the need for the fullest possible accounting of our POW/MIAs. (p.33) (See also pp.301-303, 344)

. . . {They} reflect the highest standards of voluntary, public service and deserve the nation's gratitude and praise. (p.34)

2. Organizations engaged in POW recovery operations have uniformly failed in their efforts, have been based on poor or fraudulent intelligence, can interfere with official activities, and sometimes violate laws.

. . . operations {to rescue or recover} information concerning possible American POWs . . . included: 1) the Team Falcon operation in 1991-1992; 2) a 1988 effort to locate prisoners in Laos; 3) Operation Skyhook II, an early 1980's initiative also {to find} prisoners in Laos; and 4) the efforts of . . . Bo Gritz. None . . . have(sic) been successful in rescuing prisoners or in uncovering evidence that prisoners are being held. (p.33) (See also pp.314-340, 344)

. . . such operations are dependent on sources of information . . . that have a very poor record of reliability and, in some cases, a consistent track record of fraud. (p.34)

. . . it is unrealistic to believe that such efforts will have a better chance of success than official efforts. (p.34)

. . . such operations might jeopardize ongoing U.S. diplomatic and intelligence activities. (p.34)

. . . {They} sometimes involve the violation of U.S. and/or foreign law. (p.34)

3. Private organizations that have offered rewards for POW/MIA information have encouraged a "cottage industry" in Indochina that is engaged in the manufacture and reporting of false documentation, photographs and accounts.

. . . photographs of individuals purported to be of U.S. POWs . . . are sometimes used by private organizations as a means of attracting financial support for "rescue" or "reconnaissance" operations. . . . The . . . photographs . . . allegedly depicting . . . Donald Carr, Daniel V. Borah, John L. Robertson, Larry J. Stevens and Albro Lundy are fraudulent. (p.33)

The manufacture of fraudulent POW/MIA materials, including photographs, dog tags and other purported evidence of live Americans has become a cottage industry in parts of Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand. Sadly, these activities have been spurred by well-intentioned private offers of large rewards. . . . (p.34)

4. A few private POW/MIA organizations have used false or misleading information in fund solicitations and diverted funds to purposes other than those advertised.

The Committee was concerned about . . . the extent to which some groups have diverted funds for purposes other than those advertised, the possibility that misleading or false information has been included in solicitations, . . and the impact that these solicitations may have had on the emotions and expectations of POW/MIA families. (p.33)

In some instances, an excessive percentage of funds raised has been retained by the fundraising organization. In others, the fundraising solicitations have over-stated to the point of distortion the weight of evidence indicating that live U.S. POWs continue to be held in Southeast Asia. (p.43)

World War II

Some American POWs were held by the former Soviet Union after World War II but there is no proof that any are now being held against their will.

. . . some U.S. POWs were held in the former Soviet Union after WW II . . . {but} no Americans are currently being held against their will. (p.36) (See also pp. 417-421, 442)

. . . several hundred U.S. POWs were held against their will on Soviet territory at the end of World War II. In almost all cases, these were individuals . . . who could . . . be considered Soviet citizens by the Soviet Government. (p.36) (See also p.443)

The Cold War

Some American military personnel were captured in Cold War incidents and imprisoned by the former Soviet Union and the possibility that one or more may still be held within those former borders cannot be ruled out.

. . . some U.S. personnel, still unaccounted for from the Cold War, were taken captive and held within the former Soviet Union. (p.36) (See also pp. 421-422)

. . . the Committee cannot, . . rule out the possibility that one or more U.S. POWs from past wars or incidents are still being held. . . . (p.36)

The Korean War

1. Soviet officials were involved in the interrogation of American POWs.

There is strong evidence . . . that Soviet military and intelligence officials were involved in the interrogation of American POWs. . . . (p.36) (Also see pp. 421-422)

The Russians have admitted that they interrogated U.S. POWs during the Korean War period. (p. 401)

2. Many American POWs were held in China during the war and POW camps in Korea were run by the Chinese.

. . . North Korean officials . . . substantiated indications that many American POWs had been held in China and . . . POW camps in both China and North Korea were run by Chinese officials. (p.39) (See also p.446)

The case of Sgt. Steve E. Kiba demonstrates conclusively that, . . at least some {U.S. POWs} were transferred to the People's Republic of China (PRC). (p.414)

. . . propaganda photos showing POW camps and large numbers of U.S. personnel had, in fact, been taken in China, not in North Korea. . . . (p.39) (See also p.446)

. . . other information from both high level Russian intelligence sources and from several U.S. intelligence reports corroborate the comments made by the North Koreans. (p.39)

3. A breakthrough in terms of gaining access to new information about POW/MIAs from the North Koreans has been reached.

. . . in view of the Vice-Chairman's trip to North Korea, . . a dramatic breakthrough has been achieved in terms of establishing a dialogue and gaining access to new information on POWs and MIAs. (p.40) (Also see p.447)

Until recently, the Government of North Korea has provided little cooperation to the United States in accounting for missing U.S. servicemen . . . . A series of diplomatic initiatives over the past five years, however, give grounds for hope that progress may be possible in the future. (p.415)

4. Some American POWs were taken to the Soviet Union. {There is} strong evidence that some unaccounted for American POWs from the Korean Conflict were transferred to the former Soviet Union in the early 1950's. (p.36) (Also see p. 443) . . . there is evidence, consisting of TFR interviews with prison guards and others, that some U.S. POWs may haveed to the on during the Korean War. (p.405)

Lt. Col. Corso estimated that each of train loads contained about 450 prisoners, for a total of 900 POWs transported to the Soviet Union. (pp.411-412) y of Col. Delk Simpson, . . also supported the possibility that large numbers of U.S. prisoners were transferred to Soviet territory during the Korean war period. (p.213)

5. One or more POWs from the Korean Conflict could still be alive on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

. . . one or more POWs from the Korean Conflict could still be alive on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The most notable case . . . concerns a USAF pilot named David "Markham" or "Markin", who was reportedly shot down during the Korean Conflict. (p.37) (Also see pp. 442, 444)

6. It is likely that many remains of MIA's and some documents relating to POW/MIAs can be obtained from North Korea if a joint commission can be established there.

It is likely that a large number of possible MIA remains can be repatriated and several records . . . on POWs and MIAs can be provided from North Korea once a joint working level commission is set up. . . . (p.39) (Also see p.446)

U.S.-Russian Cooperation on POW/MIA Matters

The POW/MIA research and investigative effort in Russia is being actively conducted by Task Force Russia but much remains to be done.

Although there is still much work to be done, Russian officials deserve credit for providing access to archival material, for cooperating in efforts to solicit testimony from Russian veterans and other citizens . . . . (p.37) (Also see pp. 431-435)

. . . Task Force Russia has been actively investigating . . . and is keeping surviving family members fully apprised of its progress to date. (p.36) (Also see pp.423-424, 430, 443)

Large quantities of records . . . remain to be reviewed. (p.35) (Also see pp.436-438)

. . . many well-informed former military and intelligence officers and diplomatic personnel . . . have not been interviewed. (p.35) (Also see p.441)

It is possible that evidence will be uncovered indicating greater involvement of former Soviet officials in the interrogation, transportation or detention of U.S. POWs from the Vietnam War and prior conflicts. (p.35)

. . . the U.S. {is} "intentionally being stonewalled" by the Russians on the subject of Cold War incidents. (p.36) (Also see p.443)

PART FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE

The sentences and paragraphs appearing in bold type are direct quotes from the cited pages of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Report of 13 January 1993.

The War in Indochina. Accounting for the Missing

1. Accounting for MIAs should continue to be a matter of highest national priority.

Accounting for missing Americans from the war in Southeast Asia should continue to be treated as a "matter of highest national priority" . . . . (pp.17, 164)

2. The remaining unresolved discrepancy cases should be investigated in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Continued, best efforts should be made to investigate the remaining, unresolved discrepancy cases in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. (pp.17,165)

3. With regard to the MIAs last known to be in Laos: The U.S. should make a continuing effort to secure an accounting of the MIAs in Laos through regular, tri-partite, U.S.-Lao-Vietnamese meetings at high levels.

The United States should make a continuing effort, at a high level, to arrange regular tri-partite meetings. . . to seek information on . . . unaccounted for U.S. personnel . . . in Laos. . . . (pp.17-18, 165)

The War in Indochina. Concerning Executive Branch Policy and Performance

1. There should be regular, independent reviews of DoD's performance in accounting for the MIAs.

The President and the Secretary of Defense should order regular, independent reviews of the efficiency and professionalism of DoD's POW/MIA accounting process for Americans still listed as missing from the war in Southeast Asia. (pp.18, 165)

2. There should be regular evaluations of DIA's POW/MIA office to ensure that intelligence information is exploited quickly and promptly shared with the families.

. . . the Secretary of Defense {should} ensure the regular review and evaluation of the DIA's POW/MIA office to ensure that intelligence information is acted upon quickly and that information is shared with families promptly. (pp.20, 165) (See also pp. 176-177)

3. On the subject of the League of Families participation in the Inter-agency Group: The role and composition of the IAG should be re-evaluated with a bias toward eliminating participation by the League of Families.

The Committee finds wisdom in the principle of Government's maintaining an arm's-length relationship with private organizations, . . . Therefore, the committee recommends that the role of the IAG, and its present composition, be re-evaluated, . . with a bias against its continued joint operation with a private organization. (p.282)

4. There should be a rapid and thorough follow-up and evaluation of current unresolved and future live-sighting reports.

. . . the Committee recommends a strong emphasis on the rapid and thorough follow-up and evaluation of current unresolved and future live-sighting reports. (p.22) (Also see p.200)

5. Major reforms are required in the handling of apparent signals possibly constructed by POWs in Indochina.

The intelligence community must respond more rapidly to potential ground-to-air signals identified on overhead imagery. If a possible symbol is the work of a POW, it is vital we visit that site immediately. (p.217)

. . . an inter-agency task group of experienced imagery analysts {should} be formed to review all available imagery . . . after 1973, for indications of possible distress symbols. (p.217)

DIA and CIA should establish a closer and more formalized working relationship with JSSA. . . . {and} JSSA {should} be permitted to attend IAG meetings, . . . (p.217)

Pilot distress symbols should, immediately, be designated a priority collection requirement in Southeast Asia. (p.218)

All imagery analysts with responsibilities pertaining to POW/MIA analysis, should be thoroughly briefed and preferably trained in SERE techniques and methods. (p.218)

6. DIA analysts should maintain a positive attitude on the question of surviving POWs.

The highest priority should continue to be given to credible reports that live Americans are currently being held. (p.200)

The DIA is urged to make a continued and conscious effort to maintain an attitude among analysts that presumes the possible survival of U.S. POWs. (p.22) (Also see p.200)

7. The ability of the U.S. to conduct POW/MIA investigations and inspections should be expanded in Indochina.

The Executive branch is also urged to continue working to expand our ability to conduct on the ground, on-site investigation and inspections throughout the region. (p.22) (Also see p.200)

8. The DIA POW/MIA office should be moved to Hawaii and its public and family relations functions should be assumed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs.

. . . this would be an opportune time to move the DIA's POW/MIA office to Hawaii where it could be closer to JTF-FA and CINCPAC, which it supports. . . . public and family relations can be handled . . . more capably and appropriately by the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs. (p.21) (See also p.177)

Executive Branch Relations with Families

1. U.S. officials working on POW/MIA matters in the field in Indochina should meet, when possible, with families in the United States.

Those actually working on POW/MIA accounting in the field . . . should be made available . . . to meet with families in the United States. (p.41) (Also see p.369)

2. The DoD must assign properly trained personnel, sensitive to the concerns and feelings of the families, to positions that interact with the next-of-kin of the missing.

. . . the Department of Defense must . . . ensure that properly trained personnel provide the necessary and fundamentally important interaction with family members. (p.171)

3. The Executive Branch should assist Vietnam era POW/MIA family members who wish to visit Indochina for discussions with U.S. and foreign officials.

Family members of Vietnam era POW/MIAs who would like to travel to Southeast Asia for direct discussions with . . . U.S. and foreign government officials should be encouraged and helped to do so. (p.41)

4. A regular POW/MIA newsletter should be published for families.

The resumed publication of a regular newsletter containing POW/MIA related information would be a useful means of sharing new developments with the families. (p.41) (Also see p.369)

5. The Executive Branch should establish a comprehensive data base, on a system readily available to families, with information on all POW/MIAs from all past conflicts.

. . . a central computerized data base within the Executive Branch with information on all unaccounted for U.S. personnel from past conflicts, to include World War II, Korea, the Cold War and Vietnam {should be immediately established}. . . . Procedures should also be developed to ensure that requests for information . . . can be processed easily so that family members receive prompt, printed responses when necessary. (p.41) (See also pp. 369-370)

Our people, and especially our POW/MIA families, have a right to know about the fate of their fellow countrymen and loved ones. (p.43)

For families whose experience with the Government has shattered their faith in it, only full disclosure of everything the Government knows will reassure them. (p.351)

Future Conflicts

1. The responsibility for POW/MIA issues in future conflicts should be assigned to one individual, with a clearly defined hierarchy, capable of commanding full and rapid coordination and cooperation among all involved agencies.

A clear hierarchy of responsibility for handling POW/MIA related issues {in} . . . future conflicts must be established. . . . it requires, above all, the designation within the Executive branch of an individual who is clearly responsible and fully accountable for making certain that the process works as it should. (pp.18, 165)

It is imperative that the Intelligence Community's activities on behalf of POW-MIA affairs be streamlined and centralized. (p.176)

. . . all information obtained during any unsuccessful or partially successful military search and rescue mission should be shared with the agency responsible for accounting for POW/MIAs. . . . (p.18, 165)

2. An Inter-agency Coordination Center should be created for POW/MIA intelligence under the Director of Central Intelligence.

. . . a central coordinating mechanism for pooling and acting upon POW/MIA-related intelligence information should be created as one of the Intelligence Community's Inter-agency Coordination Centers. (p.21)

. . . effective Intelligence Community support of POW-MIA affairs could be improved significantly by the creation of an inter-agency "Center for POW-MIA Affairs" under the Director of Central Intelligence. (p.177)

3. Missing civilians and deserters should be integrated into the POW/MIA accounting process.

. . . the integration of missing civilians and suspected deserters into the overall accounting process {is required.} (pp.18, 165)

4. Liaison must be established between our peace negotiators and those responsible for POW/MIA accounting and the related intelligence.

. . . a clear liaison between those responsible for the accounting (and related intelligence) and those responsible for negotiating . . . about the terms for peace {is required.} (pp.18, 165)

5. There must be procedures for prompt and full disclosure of information to next of kin.

Procedures for the full, honest and prompt disclosure of information to next of kin, at the time of the incident and as other information becomes available {are required.} (p.18, 165)

6. Military service casualty officers should be knowledgeable, experienced civilians, not subject to frequent transfer in order effectively to deal with families.

. . . casualty offices should be headed by civilians who are not subject to . . . routine duty rotations . . . {and} must have experience and . . . institutional memory. . . .(p.41) (Also see p. 369)

7. Clear and consistently applied POW/MIA categories must be established.

. . . clear categories should be established and consistently maintained in accounting for Americans missing during time of war. . . . They should be carefully separated in official summaries and discussions . . . and . . . applied consistently and uniformly. (pp.18, 165)

8. The applicable law should be reviewed to minimize the influence financial considerations may have on the determination of status.

Present law needs to be reviewed to minimize distortions in the status determination process that may result from the financial considerations of the families involved. (pp.18, 165)

U.S.-Russian Cooperation on POW/MIA Matters

1. The U.S. Government should demonstrate to the Russian leadership that the U.S continues to plce a high priority on Russian cooperation on this issue.

It is vital . . .Congress and in the Executive branch, continue to demonstrate to Russian authorities that America attaches a high priority to cooperation on this issue . . . .(p.38)

2. The U.S.-Russia Joe continued and the full cooperation of the other Republics of the former Soviet Union should be secured.

The Committee also recommends strongly that the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission be continued and that efforts be made to gain the full cooperation, as needed and appropriate, of the other Republics of the former Soviet Union. (p.38)

3. The Joint Commission should place special attention on gainiation about Cold War losses.

The Committee urges the Joint Commission to place special attentifurther information on the fate of those U.S. personnel . . . taken captive during the Cold War. (p.39) (See al3)

Investigation is required relative to the possible transfer of . . . reports concerning the possibility that U.S. POWs were the former Soviet Union deserve further (p.37)

Accounting joint, working level, POW/MIA commission should be established with the North Koreans.

. . . the Committee strongly urges the Departments of State and Defense to take immediate steps to form this commission through the United Nations Command in Panmunjom, Korea. . . . and encourages President-elect Clinton . . . to appoint a high level representative to . . .the commission. (p.39) (Also see p.446)

2. Defense and State sna similar to Task Force Russia.

. . . the People's Republic of China surely has information on the . . American POWs. The Committee, therefore, strongly urges the Departments of State and Defense to form a POW/MIA task force on China similar to Task Force Russia. . . . the Department of State {should} raise this matter at the higheevels in Beijing. (p.39) (Also see p.446)

SECTION II: ANALYSIS of the FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, and RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

In this section, we examine the five findings or conclusions (the Report makes no appreciable distinction between the two categories) we have isolated as those that go to the heart of the issues involved in the entire POW/MIA matter. These are the ones about which the controversy has swirled for these many years after Homecoming. Were any POWs left behind and do any survive today? Was there, or is there, a "cover-up", or is the shoddy performance of successive administrations more properly attributed to incompetence or an absence of commitment? What about the POWs who failed to return after World War II, the Cold War and Korea? What happened to them? The Committee speaks to these issues, but settles none of them.

Following the discussion of the findings, we move to the recommendations and assess them for relevance, their likely contributions to resolving some of the outstanding issues, and their feasibility. And The American Legion offers some of its own recommendations.

PART ONE: THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Finding Number One:

The American Legion is convinced, based on available evidence, that American POWs were detained by the Communists after homecoming. There is sufficient evidence in the form of sighting reports and other intelligence to lead us to believe there is a better than average possibility of American prisoners being held in Indochina today. The Senate Select Committee found the following:

A small number of Americans may have been detained by the Communists after Homecoming, but there is no compelling evidence that any are in captivity in Indochina today.

We believe that the body of evidence-- human intelligence, communications intelligence, and high altitude aerial photographs-- of Americans in captivity after March 1973 compels a less equivocal stand. We are not content with the assertion of a "possibility of survival." We believe that the live-sighting reports alone, beginning with Robert Garwood, are convincing, compelling proof, beyond reasonable doubt, that some POWs are still alive in captivity in Indochina after the completion of the Homecoming operation.

Assuredly, there is evidence that the Vietnamese Communists did not return at Homecoming, all the Americans they or their Pathet Lao or Cambodian allies had captured. There is unanimous agreement on that point, even by officials of the Nixon Administration who testified. Reduced to its essentials, the dispute is about whether it was reasonable, and moral, to assume that the Vietnamese returned all the live POWs they or their allies had control over at the time the last increment of POWs stepped off the plane at Clark Air Force Base.

The other indication that POWs might still be held in remote regions of Indochina was the appearance of possible evasion and escape symbols, appeals for rescue, covertly constructed by POWs in accordance with their training and using prearranged numbers and figures. The Committee said that it "cannot rule out the possibility that U.S. POWs attempted to signal their status . . . (but it) . . . cannot conclude . . . that this definitely happened." Based upon our review of the Report and the testimony, we believe strongly that the evidence is convincing that some of the suspected symbols were indeed authentic.

The North Vietnamese had offered to exchange POWs for "reparations." The Committee investigated two such reported events but "found no convincing evidence of any such offer being made." However, the Committee refused to subpoena the key witness to the most plausible of the two cases, while admitting that the "incidents require further explanation."

We believe that the evidence supports the position taken by Senators Smith and Grassley. The body of evidence is particularly strong through 1981, but credible live-sighting reports continued to be received long after then. DIA has yet to evaluate a live-sighting report that constitutes "evidence" in its view (see the Report, pp. 21-22). That evaluation is difficult to reconcile with the fact that the quantity and quality of all-source intelligence was sufficient to stage and nearly launch a covert operation to rescue 30 POWs in Laos in 1981.

The Nixon Administration leadership announced that all POWs were home, assuming that those who did not return as expected were dead. Meanwhile, the military officers and bureaucrats, who were charged with the problem, were unwilling to say they are all dead. At least, they operated on the assumption that some were alive and continued to collect and analyze intelligence about POWs/MIAs. Who was right? The Committee failed to make its opinion clear. It says there was a "possibility of survival, at least for a small number," and while "there is no proof that U.S. POWs survived, . . . neither is there proof that all of those who did not return had died."

Somewhat gratuitously, it went on to say that it could not "discern a motive for holding prisoners . . . for another 19 years." Troubling over a motive may be a fruitless pursuit, but we should note that the Communists in Vietnam and Laos, sentenced their own people--who wound up on the losing side--to long terms in prison or "reeducation" camps, to 16 or 17 years in many cases. The motive? It seems to be mostly to punish, to humiliate. And that urge to punish and humiliate those who injured them, those who prolonged the terrible and costly struggle, may have been motivation enough for them to hold American prisoners.

The next questions are, for how long did they survive? Are any still alive in captivity? The Committee concedes, as discussed above, that some POWs may have been detained after Homecoming, but does not speculate on how long these detainees may have survived. However, it says that "there is no compelling evidence that proves that any American remains alive in captivity. . . ." It goes on to say that it finds no "grounds for encouragement" in live-sightings or other intelligence. Senator John Kerry, in his floor statement of 25 January, said, quite bluntly, "there is, in my view, no reasons to believe that any Americans remain alive today." Senators Smith and Grassley dissent on this point; they "believe that live-sighting reports and other sources of intelligence are evidence that POWs may have survived to the present." They do not assert that POWs are alive in captivity; they say some may have survived to the present.

We also note that the Committee, despite its skepticism about surviving POWs, urges a positive attitude on the subject for DIA analysts:

The highest priority should continue to be given to credible reports that live Americans are currently being held. (p. 200)

The DIA is urged to make a continued and conscious effort to maintain an attitude among analysts that presumes the possible survival of U.S. POWs. (p. 22)

Therefore, based on the entire body of evidence when taken together from the whole collection of intelligence, The American Legion can only conclude that POWs remained in captivity long after 1973, and it is possible that some are still being held in Indochina.

Finding Number Two:

There was no conspiracy to cover-up POW/MIA information from families or the public.

The Committee searched for evidence of a conspiracy by questioning some Administration officials who would have been engaged in it had such a conspiracy existed. Not surprisingly, none of the witnesses chose to incriminate himself. And the Committee's examination of documents revealed no such evidence either. (The essence of conspiracy is secrecy and successful ones are rarely documented by the conspirators.) Therefore, the Committee concluded that "the conspiracy cupboard is bare." Notwithstanding the unconvincing quality of this element of the Committee's investigation, we must concede that, based on the evidence set forth in the report, the Administration activities were designed to cover-up or mislead the public and the families.

If it were not a conspiracy, it was a concentrated cover-up driven by a policy. A policy to put Vietnam and the whole ugly POW/MIA problem behind us. The evidence is overwhelming in this regard. Preoccupied with Watergate and hamstrung by a Congress that would not even appropriate enough funds to keep a desperate, erstwhile ally--South Vietnam--alive, the Nixon Administration declared all the POWs dead. After all, the President had no means, no capability to do anything about it anyway. This created the attitude in the bureaucracy that led to the "mind-set to debunk" all reports of live POWs. It caused a change in how the missing were referred to; "Before the peace agreement was signed, those 'last known alive' were referred to as 'POW's;' afterwards, they were publicly . . . called 'missing'."

The Committee suggests that Administration statements to the effect that "they're all home" were "designed to avoid raising . . . false hopes among POW/MIA families, rather than to mislead the American people." This seems an overly generous interpretation. The record of the Executive Branch's treatment of families, in successive Administrations, contains little evidence of compassion or empathy.

It could be argued that the misleading statements were really designed to close the books on the issue. If an undesirable situation is intractable, one politically acceptable solution may be to deny that it exists. Furthermore, if all the POWs are dead, then you can quit looking for them. And that is what they did. Some of the Committee's observations on this point bear repeating here:

". . . all DIA directors since the late 1970's testified that the POW effort lacked national-level Intelligence Community support in terms of establishing a high priority for collection, in funding, in allocation of personnel and in high-level attention."

". . . in 1979, the national intelligence priority assigned the POW/MIA issue was at the lowest U.S. national priority--Priority 7."

"{The CIA had} no written collection requirement on POWs, . . ."

". . . signals intelligence collection efforts in Southeast Asia were dismantled after the war and was(sic) not resumed until at least 1978." ". . . neither the DIA nor any other agency within the Intelligence Community placed a formal requirement for collection with NSA concerning POW/MIA related information. . . . NSA end product reports were not used regularly to evaluate the POW/MIA situation until 1977. It was not until 1984 that the collection of information on POW/MIAs was formally established as a matter of highest priority for SIGINT."

The policy was announced in President Nixon's famous statement, "All our American POW's are on their way home." It was reinforced by Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements when he told Dr. Roger Shields, head of the Defense Department's POW office, "All the American POWs are dead." When Dr. Shields objected, Secretary Clements said, "You didn't hear me; they're all dead." This became the policy.

Finding Number Three:

Some American POWs were held by the Soviet Union after World War II, but there is no proof that any are still captive.

We are in general agreement with this finding and must add that 48 years is a long time to wait for the truth. The principal dispute among the researchers on this issue is not whether the Soviets held American POWs they "liberated" from German POW camps, but how many and who were they. The Russians contend that the number is small and the prisoners were Americans with Soviet citizenship. The Committee tends to accept this explanation, but acknowledges that the investigation has only begun. Taking cognizance of the independent research conducted by Sanders, Sauter, Brown, Ashworth and others, obstructed as it was by the U.S. Government's refusal in too many cases to release archival materials, we do not accept the Russian accounting.

Do any of these ex-POWs remain alive in custody? No proof of survival has surfaced so far, but the Committee says, flatly, ". . . no Americans are currently being held against their will." We believe that the judgment on surviving POWs should be deferred until Task Force Russia announces that it has completed its investigation.

Finding Number Four:

Some Americans captured by the Soviets during the Cold War may still be held on the territory of the former U.S.S.R.

Here is the Committee's verbatim statement: ". . . some U.S. personnel, still unaccounted for from the Cold War, were taken captive and held within the former Soviet Union." And, ". . . the Committee cannot . . . rule out the possibility that one or more U.S. POWs from past wars or incidents are still being held." (The word, "incidents", in this context, means Cold War shoot-downs of U.S. aircraft, primarily electronic reconnaissance aircraft.)

The evidence of capture of U.S. military personnel from some of these "incidents" is, to use one of the Committee's favorite adjectives, "compelling." We agree with this finding. It is up to Task Force Russia to find the survivors, if there be any.

Finding Number Five:

Some American POWs were taken to the U.S.S.R. during the Korean War and could still be alive there.

There was general agreement on this statement from all the knowledgeable witnesses that appeared before the Committee. But, as was the case with World War II, the disagreements arose over the numbers of POWs involved in the transfer to the Soviet Union. Colonels Corso and Simpson, James Sanders, Thomas Ashworth and John M.G. Brown put the figure in the hundreds, while RAND researcher Paul Cole said the number "was certainly less than 100." Neither viewpoint can be proved with absolute certainty, but the evidence inclines us toward the higher range. More study and more work by Task Force Russia may help settle the matter, but only cooperation by the Russians, Koreans and Chinese will produce anything approaching a final answer.

The Committee expressed keen interest in the case of "David Markham" or "Markin" and rested its case for the survivability of POWs from Korea in Russia on the possibility that "Markin" was an American POW from the Korean War, and that he was alive somewhere in Russia.

We concur with the Committee that POWs were taken from Korea to the old U.S.S.R. and some may survive in Russia today.

PART TWO: THE RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation Number One:

Accounting for the missing from the Indochina War should have the highest national priority.

This phrasing of the Committee's recommendation is derived from three statements found in the Report, which we extract and display on page 38 of our analysis. The Committee calls for accounting for the missing, investigating the unresolved "discrepancy cases", and "tri-partite meetings" with Vietnam and Laos to "seek information" on the missing in Laos. The recommendation is a not-too-subtle affirmation of the Committee's conclusion that there are no POWs left in Indochina. It insists on accounting for the missing, but avoids mention of recovering POWs.

As we asserted in our discussion of the Committee's "Finding Number One", pages 47-49 of this analysis, we believe that it is possible that some POWs remain in captivity in Indochina. This possibility should not have been discounted by the Committee and ignored in its recommendation.

Accordingly, we support the assignment of the highest national priority to accounting for the missing and to the recovery of all POWs that may remain in captivity. This position is clearly announced in the preamble of Resolution No. 75, adopted at The American Legion's National Convention, Chicago, August 1992:

The American Legion has called for increased efforts by the U.S. Government to ensure that this issue is treated as a principal national priority, and for the government to accelerate efforts in every honorable way to obtain the release of Americans still held prisoner, the fullest possible accounting for those missing in action, and repatriation of the remains of those who were killed in action or died in captivity.

Recommendation Number Two:

There should be regular, independent reviews of DoD's performance in POW/MIA matters, to include DIA's conduct of its relations with the families.

The essential elements of this recommendation are found in two statements in the "Executive Summary" of the Committee Report:

The President and the Secretary of Defense should order regular, independent reviews of the efficiency and professionalism of DoD's POW/MIA accounting process for Americans still listed as missing from the war in Southeast Asia. (p. 18)

. . . the Secretary of Defense {should} ensure the regular review and evaluation of DIA's POW/MIA office to ensure that intelligence information is acted upon quickly and that information is shared with families promptly. (p. 20)

We agree, without qualification, that the agencies and activities conducting POW/MIA affairs should be subjected to frequent, periodic inspections to evaluate their performance. We would not limit our reviews to the Department of Defense, but would include the concerned offices of the Department of State and the entire Intelligence Community.

The second part of this recommendation is inconsistent with other Committee recommendations and would perpetuate the failed and flawed assignment of the function of Government-family relations to an intelligence organization. Certainly, the DIA POW/MIA office should process intelligence information promptly, as recommended by the Committee. This is so obvious it should not have to be stated and the fact that the Committee did so says a lot about the way DIA's POW office conducted its affairs. But DIA should have no interface whatsoever with the families. Intelligence analysts must conduct their art with absolute objectivity, a most difficult task at best, and should be insulated from subjective, emotional influences. The product the analysts produce may be "shared with families promptly," as recommended by the Committee, but the decision to do so, and the activity to accomplish it, should be removed from DIA. In fact, the Committee recommends this on pages 21 and 176-177:

. . . public and family relations can be handled . . . more capably and appropriately by the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA Affairs.

The Committee expanded on this theme--how the Executive Branch could improve its performance in support of the families of the missing and prisoners of war--in several other recommendations:

Those actually working on POW/MIA accounting in the field . . . should be made available . . . to meet with families in the United States. . . . Procedures should also be developed to ensure that requests for information . . . can be processed easily so that family members receive prompt, printed responses when necessary. (p.41)

. . . the Department of Defense must . . . ensure that properly trained personnel provide the necessary and fundamentally important interaction with family members. (p.171)

Our people, especially our POW/MIA families, have a right to know about the fate of their fellow countrymen and loved ones. (p. 43)

For families whose experience with the Government has shattered their faith in it, only full disclosure of everything the Government knows will reassure them. (p. 351)

The American Legion fully endorses these recommendations. They are consistent with and supportive of The Legion's Resolution 75, cited with Recommendation Number One, above. On this subject, The Legion resolved:

That The American Legion assist the families of POWs and MIAs in ensuring that any evidence, reports, photographs, or other information relating to their loved ones is given effective, expeditious and sincere consideration by the Department of Defense; and be it further . . .

RESOLVED, That The American Legion support legislation that allow the release of all information relating to live sightings and other data pertaining to POWs and MIAs; . . .

Recommendation Number Three:

The DoD investigatory effort in Indochina should be expanded.

This recommendation applies essentially to investigations of live-sighting reports and possible symbols constructed by POWs, and locating and excavating old crash-sites. The Committee expressed these requirements as follows:

The Executive Branch is also urged to continue working to expand our ability to conduct on the ground, on-site investigation and inspections throughout the region. (p. 22)

. . . the Committee recommends a strong emphasis on the rapid and thorough follow-up and evaluation of current and future live-sighting reports. (p. 22)

Pilot distress symbols should, immediately, be designated a priority collection requirement in Southeast Asia. . . . {and} All imagery analysts with responsibilities pertaining to POW/MIA analysis should be thoroughly briefed and preferably trained in SERE techniques and methods. (p. 218) {Further}, The intelligence community must respond more rapidly to potential ground-to-air signals identified on overhead imagery. If a possible symbol is the work of a POW, it is vital that we visit that site immediately. {And} . . . an inter-agency task group of experienced imagery analysts {should} be formed to review all available imagery . . . of possible distress signals. (p. 217)

In its "Retrospective", beginning on page 447, the Committee urges the Executive Branch to "continue to work with the governments . . ." of Indochina on finding answers to outstanding questions.

We agree that the investigative effort in Indochina, in all its aspects, should be expanded and intensified. We consider this a vital element in the process of reaching the fullest possible accounting.

We are unconvinced that the so-called live-sighting investigations that are currently being conducted have any significant value or contribute much to the evaluation of any live-sighting report. This assessment rests on the facts that all live-sighting investigations are conducted with the foreknowledge of the host government, government officials monitor all aspects of the investigations, including interviews with witnesses, and may refuse to produce witnesses if they so wish. Honest, productive, objective investigations are not possible under these conditions.

Recommendation Number Four:

A comprehensive reorganization of the mechanisms for handling POW/MIA matters in future conflicts is required.

Under this heading we have grouped the Committee's recommendations for centralizing the responsibility for POW/MIA affairs, for reorganizing intelligence support, for changes in determining status of the missing, and for improvements in handling relations with the next-of-kin.

The Committee addresses the first issue in this manner:

A clear hierarchy of responsibility for handling POW/MIA related issues {in} . . . future conflicts must be established. . . . it requires, above all, the designation within the Executive branch of an individual who is clearly responsible and fully accountable for making certain that the process works as it should. (p.18)

The Committee urges the continuation of the Inter-agency Group (IAG) as an appropriate vehicle to coordinate POW/MIA policy (page 449) but recommends that it maintain formal records of its proceedings. In the event the "clear hierarchy of responsibility" recommended by the Committee is established, it is not clear to the Legion that the IAG would perform a useful function.

The American Legion is fully supportive of the concept of high-level, centralized direction and control. At its August Convention, in Resolution 75, cited above, the Legion resolved:

That The American Legion urge the President of the United States to appoint a senior high-level official to carry out the primary responsibility of interpreting policy and exercising overall direction and control of POW/MIA activities and designate the service secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commandants of the Marine Corps and Coast Guard, with the mission and functions currently assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency; . .

On the matter of the second issue, that of directing and coordinating intelligence support pertaining to POW/MIA matters, the Committee recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence establish and direct an Inter-agency Coordination Center. The Committee recognized the requirement to collect and exploit all-source intelligence and that this could best be accomplished through centralized command and control of collection and analytical assets. The American Legion concurs in this approach. It should go a long way toward correcting the deficiencies observed by successive DIA directors and by the Committee. (See Part Three, above, p. 27, et. seq.)

The third issue discussed by the Committee in the matter of organizational changes and policy concerns the definition and assignment of casualty categories. First, the Committee believes that confusion would be minimized if data on missing civilians and suspected military deserters was integrated into the overall personnel accounting process. The Legion finds merit in this recommendation.

Secondly, the Committee recommended that clear and consistently applied POW/MIA categories must be established. Casualty reporting, as it pertained to the missing and suspected POWs, was inconsistent during and after the Vietnam War and categories appeared to be manipulated for political reasons. The Legion firmly supports accuracy and consistency as goals for casualty accounting and reporting.

The Committee addressed the issue of casualty determination in this manner:

Present law needs to be reviewed to minimize distortions in the status determination process that may result from financial considerations of the families involved. (pp. 18, 165)

Here, the Committee is referring to the observation that persons, nearly always aviators or air-crews whose aircraft went down in circumstances which indicated no reasonable possibility of survival, were often carried in the "missing" category, if the bodies were not recovered, so that their active-duty pay and allowances would be continued to be paid to the next-of-kin. To avoid perpetuating false and impossible hopes, and to introduce objective realism into the accounting process, the Committee believes that financial considerations should not enter into the casualty determination process. The Legion can support this recommendation, but insists that the law and procedures involved in "presumptive findings of death" must also be overhauled. Such a finding must be supported by some reasonable evidence, beyond the passage of time. As the Legion stated in its Resolution No. 61:

RESOLVED, By the American Legion in National Convention assembled in Chicago, Illinois, August 25, 26, 27, 1992, That the American Legion urges the Congress to enact legislation that would disallow passage of time as the sole basis of a death declaration for missing service personnel and would provide adequate opportunities for comments from family members.

The Legion stands by this resolution.

Finally, under the heading of reorganization of the POW/MIA process for future conflicts, the Committee recommends changes to correct deficiencies in the manner in which families of the missing and the POWs were treated by the Executive Branch. It suggests that casualty officers should have the training and experience required for the task and that civilians, not subject to frequent transfer as military personnel are, should be assigned to this duty. It also recommends the establishment of procedures for prompt and full disclosure of information to next-of-kin. The Legion supports these recommendations, but would insist that the civilian casualty officers be ex-military personnel, believing that only persons with long experience in uniform can feel the empathy and establish the solid rapport with families that is necessary.

Recommendation Number Five:

A high priority should be placed on U.S.-Russian cooperation and the continuation of the Joint Commission and Task Force Russia.

The Committee is very firm on this point. It recognizes that the Commission and the Task Force have only begun to find answers. On page 37 of the Report it says:

. . . reports concerning the possibility that U.S. POWs were transferred from Vietnam to the former Soviet Union deserve further investigation and follow-up.

On pages 39 and 433 it urges the Joint Commission to devote "special attention and focus" on the missing from the Cold War, believing that success is most promising in these cases. And it emphasizes (p.38) that America must continue to demonstrate the high priority it attaches to Russian cooperation. Only by continuation of the Joint Commission and Task Force Russia can America's concern be clearly evidenced. Unfortunately, the American Embassy in Moscow appears to favor early U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Commission and the subsequent early departure of Task Force Russia.

On page 38, the Committee recommends:

The Committee also recommends strongly that the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission be continued and that efforts be made to gain the full cooperation, as needed and appropriate, of the other Republics of the former Soviet Union.

This recommendation appears again at the top of the list of recommendations beginning on page 447 of the Report: ". . . that the U.S. Russia Commission continue to pursue those leads which involve the countries of the former Soviet Union, . . ."

The American Legion has spoken to the issue of Russian cooperation on POW/MIA matters in three resolutions enacted at the 1992 National Convention:

RESOLUTION NO. 218: RESOLVED: . . . That The American Legion urges the U.S. Government to withhold such aid {to Russia} until American citizens who are currently classified as POW/MIAs held in the former Soviet Union have been identified and returned to the United States.

RESOLUTION NO. 138: RESOLVED: That the American Legion believes future congressional appropriations to international lending agencies {should} be contingent on such agencies' compliance with strict standards which would prohibit assistance to nations which . . . do not cooperate in our search for POW/MIAs of past wars. RESOLUTION NO. 60: RESOLVED: . . . That the American Legion strongly urge the U.S. Government to make a maximum effort to resolve the fate of unaccounted Americans from World War II, the Cold War, and the Korean War by obtaining the return of any live prisoners, the repatriation of remains, and the fullest possible accounting for the missing; . . .

The Joint Commission and its operating agency, Task Force Russia, hold the only hope for securing an accounting for the missing, the finding of remains, and locating and repatriating of live Americans from the former Soviet Union. Accordingly, The American Legion strongly endorses the Committee's recommendations. The Joint U.S.-Russian Commission and Task Force Russia must be continued until it is clearly shown that all avenues for accounting and recovery of POW/MIAs have been thoroughly explored.

Recommendation Number Six:

Joint commissions and/or task forces to investigate POW/MIA matters in North Korea and China should be established.

The Committee's recommendations on this subject are on pages 39 and 446 of the Report:

. . . the Committee strongly urges the Departments of State and Defense to take immediate steps to form this commission through the United Nations Command in Panmunjom, Korea. . . . and encourages President-elect Clinton . . . to appoint a high level representative to . . .the commission.

. . . the People's Republic of China surely has information on the fate of . . . American POWs. The Committee, therefore, strongly urges the Departments of State and Defense to form a POW/MIA task force on China similar to Task Force Russia. . . . the Department of State {should} raise this matter at the highest levels in Beijing.

Although it recognizes that the political realities differ markedly among Russia, China and North Korea, and that the cooperation and mechanisms for POW/MIA resolution achieved in Russia cannot be easily replicated either in China or North Korea, the Legion strongly supports the Committee's goals in this regard. The Legion's Resolutions Nos. 138 and 60, cited above, apply with equal effect to China and North Korea. Furthermore, the last paragraph of Resolution No. 60 specifically addresses North Korea:

RESOLVED, That The American Legion calls on the U.S. Government not to provide normalization or any type of aid to North Korea until it fully cooperates on POW/MIA matters.

The Legion spoke to the POW/MIA issue and China in its Resolution No. 64, also adopted at the Chicago Convention:

. . . The American Legion calls upon the Congress of the United States to reject a "most-favored-nation trade status" for the People's Republic of China unless it ceases human rights violations against its own people, provides an acceptable accounting of American POW/MIAs from the Korean War and the Vietnam War, {etc.} . . .

The Legion opposes "most-favored-nation" status for China on several grounds, but insists that the United States pursue a hard line on this matter at least until China offers the same level of cooperation the U.S. enjoys in Russia toward the resolution of the POW/MIA issue.

Other Recommendations Addressed to DoD:

In addition to the 30 recommendations we collected from the body of the report and condensed into the six discussed above, the Committee addressed seven additional recommendations to the Department of Defense (pages 448 and 449). We have listed them on page 3 of our report. Essentially, they urge the DoD to continue the efforts begun by General Vessey and continued by the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting; to re-examine the debriefs of the POWs returned at Homecoming; to release to the public all records relating to the case of Robert Garwood, the last POW to be repatriated from Vietnam; and to interview the former President of the Republic of Vietnam, Nguyen Van Thieu, regarding any information his intelligence organizations may have had on American POWs.

The American Legion can support all these recommendations. It suggests, however, that there are Vietnamese in this country, ex-intelligence officers, who are likely to recall, with greater accuracy than Mr. Thieu, any information their agencies may have had about American POWs. Furthermore, this endeavor should be secondary to securing similar information from U.S. agencies which still withhold it, or have yet to conduct a thorough search for it.

SECTION III: ASSESSMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

INTRODUCTION

The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs set down seven goals for itself. These are reproduced below, just as they appear on page 46 of the Committee's Report:

to determine whether there is evidence that American POWs survived Operation Homecoming and, if so, whether there is evidence that some may remain alive in captivity;

to ensure the adequacy of government procedures for following up on live-sighting reports and other POW/MIA related information;

to de-mystify the POW/MIA accounting process so that the families and the public can better understand the meaning behind the numbers and statistics used in discussions of the issue;

This goal is treated in Chapter 3, "Accounting for Missing Servicemen," and the Committee lists six objectives (pp. 158-159) it sought to achieve in pursuit of this goal, paraphrased here for brevity:

1. Determine how many Americans served in Indochina during the war and did not return alive or dead.

2. Evaluate the Government's process for determining the status and fate of the missing.

3. Learn what the casualty data and intelligence tell us about how many are truly "unaccounted for."

4. Determine if full accounting for the missing was accorded the "highest national priority."

5. Assess the degree to which accounting policies and practices contributed to confusion, suspicion and distrust.

6. Determine what changes must be made to instill public confidence in the process, now and for the future:

to establish an open, comprehensive record, and to provide for the broad declassification of POW/MIA materials in order to enable both the Committee and the public to make informed judgments about questions of policy, process and fact;

to lend added weight to Executive branch efforts to obtain cooperation from foreign governments in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in accounting for missing Americans;

to review the activities of private organizations who participate in fund-raising and educational efforts related to the POW/MIA issue; and

to examine, to the extent time and resources permit, unresolved issues pertaining to missing Americans from World War II, Korea, and the Cold War.

How well the Committee met its goals and fulfilled its promise is the subject of this section of the Legion's report.

GOALS

To Determine the Existence of Evidence of Surviving POWs

To fulfill this goal with unanimity may have been a "mission impossible," for success rested on each member's evaluation of the "evidence" the Committee reviewed and the testimony it heard. Most of the members agreed that it was possible that some men remained in captivity in Indochina after Homecoming, while a minority believed the evidence showed this was almost certainly the case. A small minority holds to the belief that some could still be there, alive, while the majority totally discounts the possibility.

Aside from individual interpretations of what constitutes "compelling evidence," the major factor inhibiting total success was the inability of the Committee to acquire all the available evidence. As has been noted in its own Report, for example, the Committee was denied access to CIA reports, the NSA resource was incompletely exploited, and other important documents and witnesses remain to be examined.

The greatest single failure of the Committee, in the view of The American Legion, was its failure to urge the Senate to extend the life of the Committee until it was satisfied that all information relating to surviving POWs in Indochina had been collected and analyzed, all leads had been run to ground, and all potential witnesses had been examined.

Senator John Kerry has assured that the investigation will continue "through the normal committee structure of the Congress." But we know it will not. No existing committee in either house will focus on the POW/MIA issue with the intensity required to accomplish this first goal the Select Committee set for itself.

To Ensure the Adequacy of Government Procedures

The Committee said it would, "ensure the adequacy of government procedures for following up on live-sighting reports and other POW/MIA related information."

The Committee examined these procedures and found them wanting, as had DIA's own internal investigations on three previous occasions. Worse still, the Committee received from the Defense Department and from DIA misleading, disingenuous and outright false testimony about DIA's treatment of POW/MIA intelligence information and, for the most part, let it pass without serious objection. Furthermore, the current leadership in DIA refuses to acknowledge past shortcomings in its POW/MIA operations and displays the same arrogance toward criticism the Committee observed during its hearings. We offer two illustrative examples:

Some members of the Committee, notably Senators Smith and Grassley, were particularly interested in a group of 12 or 13 live-sighting reports that alluded to American POWs being held at one time or the other in facilities deep under the Citadel and under the Ho Chi Minh tomb in downtown Hanoi. Responding to questions about these reports, a DIA analyst testified that the water table in Hanoi was too high to permit such structures below grade. He elaborated with the revelation that no buildings in Hanoi had basements. He then assured the Committee that he had ridden his bicycle all around the neighborhood and none of the local residents could tell him anything about POWs beneath their feet. The first part of this testimony is patently false; there are extensive underground structures there. The second part is simply irrelevant and meant to mislead.

This same analyst, who still occupies an influential position in DIA's POW/MIA hierarchy, testified about a number of other live-sighting reports. Among them were several reports of American prisoners seen, at various times after Operation Homecoming, in Son La Province. One of the "hearsay" reports was contained in a letter from an inmate of a Son La prison camp who wrote that "the white water-buffaloes" had been moved down to the lowlands because they had become so thin and weak. The context of the letter made it clear that the writer referred to American POWs. There was no doubt about that. But the DIA witness said that he believed the reference was to cows that were moved to the "center of Vietnam's dairy industry." This response was obviously contrived. Vietnam has nothing that could possibly be described as a "dairy industry." It proved that the "mind-set to debunk" was alive and well at DIA and displayed the witness' contempt for the Committee and its search for truth. Yet, the testimony survived in the record, unchallenged.

Throughout the Committee's hearing and investigation process, certain members and staff provided Defense Department and DIA witnesses, in advance of hearings, information the Committee investigators planned to use to brief the members and elicit testimony. The Legion believes that this conduct undermined objectivity and assisted the government witnesses to obscure the truth about how DoD and DIA performed their POW/MIA responsibilities.

To De-mystify the POW/MIA Accounting Process

The Committee did make an effort to achieve this goal. Chapter 3 of the Report describes in detail and presents, for the first time in a Congressional report, a comprehensive overview of the problem. The Committee identified six objectives (see page 40, above) that would contribute to reaching this goal. It plunged through a forest of statistical confusion and emerged with some still uncertain but understandable, rational figures on how many Americans remain unaccounted for, and scrubbed this figure down to a rational number that could still be called "missing," so far as the Committee was concerned.

The Committee examined the government's policies and procedures for casualty accounting, from the war years to the present. It presents its findings fairly lucidly in its Report. Perhaps the most damning comment appears on page 16:

The U.S. Government's process for accounting for Americans missing in Southeast Asia has been flawed by a lack of resources, organizational clarity, coordination and consistency. . . . Through the mid-1980's, accounting for our POW/MIAs was viewed officially more as a bureaucratic exercise than as a matter of "highest national priority."

The Committee expressed its dismay again on page 130:

Today, after more than a year of diligent searching, certain key groups or documents cannot yet be located. . . . many of the individual service files have either been lost or destroyed.

The Legion views this as another example of unfinished business that should have been completed before the Committee expired.

To Provide an Open Record and Broad Declassification of POW/MIA Materials

There is little doubt that the Committee made progress in openilogue on the POW/MIA issue. It held open hearings on subjects such as live-sightings, communications intercepts, and satellite photography of rescue symbols. It forced the Administration to establish a large office, the Central Documentation Office, to recover, redact and declassify thousands of classified documents. It secured access to National Security Council files, classified State Department archives and National Security Agency documents, and much of these materials have been declassified. The Committee's efforts, in part, have impelled the Administration to establish a library of POW/MIA documents for the convenience of POW/MIA families.

Unfortunately, much remains to be done on the matter of declassification. While significant progress has been made on the relatively current materials relating to the Vietnam War, the government still withholds from serious researchers and authors many documents dating back to World War II and the Korean War period. When documents are released, they are often so thoroughly redacted as to be virtually useless. The American Legion believes that the matter of classified World War II and Korean War documents that relate to the POW/MIA issue deserves the immediate attention of the Administration and the continued oversight of the Congress. The practice of maintaining security classifications on documents 40 to 50-years old to protect "sources and methods", or for any other imaginable reason, is no longer defensible.

To Reinforce Executive Branch Efforts to Obtain Cooperation from Foreign Governments

The Committee did lend added weight to efforts to obtain cooperation from foreign governments in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in accounting for missing Americans. Before the Committee intruded into the issue, which was exclusively the Executive Branch's responsibility, performance in the area of obtaining foreign cooperation was desultory at best. The Committee did, along with the Legion and others, prod the Administration, State and Defense, into action.

The U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, and its action agency, Task Force Russia, owe their existence to Senator Smith and Senator Kerry. They were instrumental in promoting the concept and participated as U.S. delegates to the Commission. Now, with the disappearance of the Committee, and faced with opposition to its continuance by our own embassy in Moscow, the future of the Commission is in doubt.

This situation is yet another example of why the Committee should have been continued.

To Review the Activities of Private Organizations

This goal seemed almost an afterthought. The investigation of private organizations was undertaken largely at the urging of Senator McCain and the investigators were not brought into the staff until late in the Committee's life. Nevertheless, the Committee's "fraud investigators"--that is what they were called at the beginning--managed, in a relatively short time, to develop much information in this area. Other than that, the Legion has no comment relative to this issue, other than to mention all information requested of this organization by the Committee was provided.

To Examine the Issues of Missing Americans from World War II, Korea, and the Cold War

The Committee prefaced the statement of this goal with, "to the extent time and resources permit," a tacit admission that it did not expect to complete the task. And it did not complete it. The only hearings on the subject took place in November and were crowded into only two days. A number of knowledgeable witnesses who would have contributed vital information could not be heard. Depositions of witnesses and sources with information about the missing in these wars were scheduled too late in the year to allow follow-up, and several important sources were never even contacted.

The American Legion, representing as it does veterans from all these wars, is deeply concerned about this unfinished business. It commends the Senate Select Committee for opening the book on these past wars, but deplores the aborted investigation into what happened to the thousands of American fighting men who disappeared in the U.S.S.R., China and North Korea. Much more needs to be done.

SECTION IV: WHAT MUST BE DONE

Although The American Legion recognizes that the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs did some good work in achieving declassification of certain documents and focusing public awareness on POW/MIA issues, it strongly believes the Committee's final report is flawed and incomplete.

When the Committee was established, the Legion had high hopes for its success -- here, at long last, would be a thorough look at the burning question of whether American POWs may still be held in captivity. The powerful authority and resources given the Committee for investigation and subpoena, and its bipartisan composition, were encouraging.

Unfortunately, the Committee has produced a report that may turn out to be improperly used to encourage further favorable U.S. Government actions toward Vietnam without receiving any substantial cooperation on the POW/MIA issue in return.

Here's why we take that view:

-- The Committee falls short of admitting to significant evidence that live Americans remained in captivity in Southeast Asia long after Operation Homecoming despite reams of good, solid intelligence information.

-- The Committee is gratuitous in its treatment of the executive branch. Incredible incompetence by the Defense Intelligence Agency is overlooked, identification errors by the Central Identification Laboratory are downplayed, and purposeful inattention by leaders of both political parties over a period of several decades toward abandoned American POWs is insufficiently highlighted.

-- The Committee does not forcefully go to bat for POW/MIA families. For over two decades the executive branch has utterly failed to show due consideration toward many of the POW/MIA families. It has refused to provide full information on their loved ones, and debunked credible evidence about the survival of their loved ones.

The American Legion is determined to fight against any further concessions to Hanoi -- such as lifting the economic embargo -- based on the Committee's incomplete work. In the long run, the Legion does not oppose lifting the embargo and normalizing relations with Vietnam -- but only after receiving the fullest possible accounting for American POWs -- some of whom may still be serving in unrecognized captivity.

The American Legion is convinced that the highest moral responsibility of this nation is to keep faith with those who serve in the Armed Forces and become prisoners of war or missing in action.

The American Legion, based on its analysis of this report, its mandates, and its ongoing monitoring of the POW/MIA issue, suggests that the following actions must be taken:

-- ORGANIZATION. POW/MIA responsibilities should be centralized in a powerful office reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency should be removed from all POW/MIA responsibilities, and each military service should become responsible for its own POW/MIAs.

-- OPERATIONS. Field operations should be given all necessary resources and conducted at a maximum rate of activity with more timely follow-up of live sighting reports.

-- INFORMATION. All POW/MIA information (except that revealing intelligence sources or methods) should be declassified in a form readily available to public review.

-- IDENTIFICATION. Reassign responsibilities for identification of remains from the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii to the Smithsonian Institution.

-- DIPLOMACY. The "Road Map" should be canceled. It only serves to justify premature lifting of the economic embargo and normalization of relations with, Vietnam. The only business of America in Vietnam should be the business of obtaining the fullest possible accounting for our POW/MIAs, until such an accounting is accomplished.

-- PRIOR WARS. Long-neglected research and investigative efforts of World War II, Cold War, and Korean War POW/MIA situations should be adequately staffed, funded, and accelerated.

-- INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. Joint Commissions should be initiated or strengthened with Russia, People's Republic of China, and North Korea, to increase POW/MIA recovery efforts.

-- FAMILY SUPPORT. A centralized, responsible office to keep POW/MIA families informed on their loved ones should be established.

-- OVERSIGHT. Congress should establish a joint standing committee on POW/MIA affairs to ensure continued action by the executive branch in addressing the POW/MIA issue. Absent such a joint committee, a Presidential commission should be established, comprised of non-government officials.